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Antinomies of the Super-Ego: 
Étienne Balibar and the question of the psycho-political 
 
 
 
Re-inventing the Super-Ego 
 
How, drawing upon psychoanalysis, might one think of the relationship between 
psychological states or conditions, on the one hand, and political forms and practices, on the 
other? What resources does psychoanalysis offer for conceptualizing either the psychological 
dimensions of the ‘political’ or, for that matter, the ‘politics’ of the psyche, especially in their 
collective or social instantiations? For many years, these have been enormous questions for 
those working in various fields of the humanities wanting—in different ways and at different 
times—to articulate psychoanalytic interpretation with political theory. Looking at the 
writings of Étienne Balibar, one particular response to such questions is to interrogate, in a 
short yet dazzling text included in the recently published volume Citizen Subject, the 
Freudian conception of the super-ego, notably in its development during the early 1920s.
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Before we come to this essay, however, originally presented on the 150
th
 anniversary of 
Freud’s birth (and in an amphitheatre named after Freud’s teacher Jean-Martin Charcot), it is 
worth situating the interactions it provokes between politics and psychoanalysis in terms of 
Balibar’s larger project, if it may be called that. A key point of departure for many of his 
writings is, of course, the enduring question of citizenship, dealt with in a range of influential 
texts including those found in We, the People of Europe? and Equaliberty. Citizenship is 
obviously both an abiding and a recursive or iterative problem for political thought. It arises 
in many contexts, not least of which is the question of Europe in all its senses; but it also 
imposes itself through the far from unrelated—though not simply identical—issue of world 
populations in flux, the relationship between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’, and so on. Needless 
to say, these questions have been powerfully renewed in more recent times, under different 
yet connected conditions and circumstances, making the 2015 English publication of 
Balibar’s Wellek lectures,2 almost a decade and a half after their original delivery, as well as 
the recent release of collections like Citizen Subject, also prepared over many years, far more 
timely than belated. The publication of such titles, in other words, reopens the question: 
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Whither citizenship? Given the rising instance and intense complications of statelessness and 
forced migration world-wide (not to mention travel bans imposed recently by the US), given 
the finance politics that, in Balibar’s own terms, make Europe an ‘apartheid’ of sorts,3 given 
the increasing privatization of public and welfare provision as an example of the erosion of 
what citizenship means in its practical as well as ideological sense, given the ongoing 
transformation of the various relationships of nation-states to the private interests of 
multinational companies (and, for that matter, the transnational social and economic effects 
of certain nation’s or groups of nations’ fiscal policy on the world’s stage), given the far-
reaching effects globally of debt capitalism, given the intensifying lack of separation between 
the political and economic spheres that would seem to mark the transition from liberal 
democracy to neoliberalism,
4
 given the impact of certain nationalisms and fundamentalisms 
of various types over the past decades, given the politics of security and ‘counter-terrorism’ 
that affects rights of all kinds—given all of this, what is to be made of citizenship today? 
 
The contribution made by Balibar’s Wellek lectures to the critical thinking of citizenship, 
civility and violence today is as undeniable as the impact of his many other writings. A word 
is due about the role played by psychoanalysis throughout these lectures, however, one that if 
anything seems to have intensified rather than diminished during that long editorial period 
between their original presentation and final publication. While it would be wrong to say that 
the entire thesis is explicitly framed and developed through continual recourse to 
psychoanalytic concepts, arguments and ideas, nonetheless I would argue that in crucial ways 
the ‘psychoanalytic’ is resorted to, albeit through a deliberately transformative gesture, as a 
vital resource for the form of thinking that Balibar deems necessary in relation to his subject 
matter.  In particular, the ‘limits’ of political philosophy alluded to in the book’s subtitle are 
arguably traced out through a distinctively resistant relationship to psychoanalysis which 
amounts neither to a rejection nor a critique, but which instead exploits the resistances of 
psychoanalysis in the interests of the most relevant questioning concerning the ‘political’ 
today.       
 
Obviously the question of violence is a key motif for the particular project of these lectures. 
At a number of points in the published text, as he re-engages the legacy of Freud, Balibar 
considers the idea of a ‘cruelty or capacity for destruction’ that is located beyond the 
Freudian death drive itself, in order that he might re-think extreme types of violence which 
exceed the forms of authoritarianism, domination and oppression that are familiar within the 
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historic arc of the nation-state. This ‘beyond’ tips over instead into a violence that stems from 
an ‘idealization of hatred’ (perhaps more and more recognizable today), which Balibar 
considers in terms of an extension or transformation of fascism beyond its ‘ordinary’ or state 
form (59-60). The reference point for the theoretical possibility of such a mutation in the 
conceptual toolkit of Freudian psychoanalysis is, interestingly, Derrida’s essay, 
‘Psychoanalysis Searches the States of its Soul: The Impossible Beyond of a Sovereign 
Cruelty’, which was presented as an address to the States General of Psychoanalysis held at 
the Sorbonne in 2000 (four years after the Welleck lectures were originally delivered, hence 
my remark above). Thus the thinking of violence in its contemporary guises comes to entail, 
for Balibar, critical re-engagement with psychoanalytic concepts, categories and forms of 
thought in the broader sense. In particular, through the reference to Derrida, it is clear that an 
understanding of sovereignty in its current manifestations (operating as a shifting ground as 
much as a stable phenomenon) benefits from this critical interaction or alignment.  
Importantly, however, the grounds of psychoanalysis are themselves transformed in the 
process. Picking up once more on Derrida’s evocation of ‘the beyond of the death drive’, for 
Balibar the latter entails ‘the dissociation of the tension or “unity of opposities”’ between life 
and death, resulting in drives which we must recognise in terms of the modern principle or 
contemporary problematic of sovereignty itself. Balibar writes: 
 
This no longer has anything to do with the psychological analogy of ill-will or human 
“evil”; the hypothesis is, rather, that the constitutive association of death with life is 
turned back against life itself, inverting the function of defense of the “ego” or of 
individuality and turning it into a process of unlimited appropriation (including—
perhaps most importantly—self-appropriation).  (143) 
  
The ‘beyond of the death drive’ exposes psychoanalysis to the ‘other’ of itself, then; a 
resistant other which in fact threatens to unseat the ‘psychological analogy’ from which new 
understandings of sovereign or political forms might otherwise seem to derive. That said, on 
closer inspection this mutation in the ‘psychological analogy’ may not in fact obliterate its 
relevance so much as restore and re-emphasise the paradoxical or perverse consequences of 
Freudian thought itself:  
 
I say that we are beyond psychologism here, but we naturally find ourselves on a very 
uncomfortable tightrope, as in Freud himself, between psychology and metaphysics, 
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or between two ways, empirical or speculative, of invoking the idea of human nature. 
The idea of the “death drive” and its beyond or limit can be reduced neither to 
Hobbes’ “war of all against all” nor to Darwin’s “natural selection” and all its 
applications in the political realm. (143)  
 
Here, the death drive—never simply reducible to ‘nature’ (so that the ‘uncomfortable 
tightrope’ is not happened upon ‘naturally’!)—itself tends to denature, distort or otherwise 
deconstruct all the borderlines between psychology and metaphysics, the empirical and the 
speculative, the ‘original’ and the ‘historical’, between natural and non-natural ‘war’ or 
‘selection’, good and evil, and so on. In this sense, the death drive as much as its ‘beyond’ or 
limit already pertains to a situation in which the ‘psychological analogy’ that would permit 
‘applications in the political realm’ is subjected to an altogether different logic.  The 
normative form—that of analogy or application—which an orthodox psychologism grants is 
not so much dispensed with in favour of a move ‘beyond’ psychoanalysis itself, as it is 
reconstituted in a manner that is more faithful to the ‘origin’, if one may put it that way. To 
go beyond psychoanalysis or the death drive is in fact also to go back to them in the most 
vigilant and rigorous fashion. From this perspective, in its thinking of the modalities of 
violence in both their historical and contemporary cast, Balibar’s Wellek lectures should be 
read and evaluated according to a rather complicated procedure whereby the conditions and 
characteristics of psychoanalytic discourse are transformed and renewed at just those 
moments that ‘psychology’ might seem to be left behind. For sure, psychoanalysis surfaces 
explicitly in many places throughout Balibar’s lectures, but the frame of reference it makes 
possible is operative not only when he discusses anxiety, the Möbius strip, the mirror-stage, 
object petit a or the Real in Lacan (through which access to relevant forms of political 
thought is sought), but also—and perhaps precisely—where the book deals more generally 
with questions of sovereignty, ‘life’, violence and civility. This is another way of saying that 
psychoanalytic thought once more seems to become most powerful at the point of a certain 
resistance to itself; a resistance one might be tempted to call ‘internal’ since it is far from 
merely extrinsic, but a resistance that is nonetheless also a radically ‘other’ force operating 
within that of which it is still an essential part.  
 
But, bearing this in mind, let us come back to Balibar’s essay on the Freudian super-ego, 
which we have said represents a crucial moment in his rethinking of the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and politics. As Balibar points out, the question of the super-ego is 
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intrinsically connected to that of the relation between political and psychic frames of 
reference, marking thereby an original point of entry of psychoanalysis into the realm of 
political thought. For Balibar, however, the Freudian concept of the super-ego must be 
understood in its historical elaboration as conditioned by a particular exchange between 
Freud and Hans Kelsen, the Austrian jurist and philosopher, that happened during this period. 
 
As Balibar shows, Kelsen detects in Freud’s work the effort to conceptualize the State 
through developing the question of the relationship between individual and society from a 
psychoanalytic point of view. For Kelsen, the psychoanalytic perspective is valuable in 
potentially overcoming the limits of mechanical sociological abstractions, current at the time.  
However, he identifies a problem or drawback in Freud’s thinking to the extent that, from 
Kelsen’s standpoint, the very concept of the State inheres, as Balibar puts it (235), ‘in the 
positing of a juridical norm’ that itself seems incompatible with the modalities of psychic life 
on any personalized scale.  Indeed, by potentially transposing the psychic dynamics of the 
psychoanalytic subject onto the question of political formations, Freudianism risks yolking its 
conception of the State to images of domination, subjection and dictatorial intent. Kelsen’s 
reading therefore challenges Freud to acknowledge the separation of the juridical order from 
the particularity or indeed totality of subjective identifications, while at the same time 
summoning the psychoanalytic approach as potentially invaluable in maintaining the 
constitutional form of the State. Kelsen’s dissatisfaction with a purely sociological 
interpretation of the juridical norm leads him, therefore, to turn to psychoanalysis as a critical 
supplement of legal and political philosophy. However, far from being charged with 
providing the explanatory apparatus linking social forms to the primordiality of psychic life, 
psychoanalysis is instead—through a critical reversal—perceived as the ‘“therapeutic” 
instrument of defense against the regressive archaism’ (237) which threatened the democratic 
State, notably at this time, through fantasies or mythologies hypostatizing State omnipotence. 
It seems, though, that the question of the origin of these very same fantasies may reveal an 
intrinsically problematic or at least indupitably complex dimension in the conceptualization 
of the State. For if there is always the risk that subjects perceive injustices in the State, then 
this implies the idea of the ‘juridical order as a coercive order which entails a sanction’, in 
Balibar’s words (237), and thus an assumption of juridical ‘personality’ to the extent that the 
State’s power is thereby linked to rather anthropomorphic ideas of action and intention. To 
defend the State against ‘regressive archaism’ in the political sphere is also to recognize the 
aggrieved sensibilities of those who purvey such politics and hence to acknowledge, albeit 
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perhaps unwittingly, the likely inevitability of a motivated conception of the State, over and 
above a functionalist construal of the norm. The upshot of this insight is both that Kelsen’s 
instinct about a psychoanalytic supplement being required to rectify sociology’s limits gets 
reinforced, but also that the separation of the juridical norm, on which he insists, looks to 
become a rather more complicated matter. 
 
If Kelsen’s reconceptualisation of the practical value of psychoanalysis nonetheless 
challenged Freud to revise the ‘antipolitical’ strain of his discourse that, in Balibar’s terms, 
‘dissolves the specificity of all institutions within a generic “prehistory” of humanity’, this 
led to a certain predicament: the ‘citizen’ form of the subject imagined by the republican 
jurist threatened to evacuate the psychoanalytic content of such subjectivity (even while it 
opened up the supplementary possibility of the complication outlined above). ‘The 
unconscious or the political’—for Balibar, that seemed to be the choice which Kelsen 
presented to Freud, notwithstanding the corrective or therapeutic value psychoanalysis might 
derive in addressing ‘pathological representations of sovereignty’ resulting from certain 
lapses in purely juridical conceptions of the State (239). And yet the fact that such 
pathologies seem to arise, historically, not just where such images of the State are inherently 
lacking but where they are threatened from without, as it were, itself implies that any attempt 
to separate the juridico-political from the ‘unconscious’ is inevitably complicated by the 
psychic reaction, akin to a subjective identification, that the ‘norm’ typically elicits.5  
 
If such an insight seems to permit the re-implication of the ‘norm’ or the ‘normal’ and the 
‘pathological’—an easy win for Freud, one might imagine—nevertheless to the extent that 
the collaboration between Kelsen and Freud arises from broader concerns about the capacity 
of the constitutional State to withstand authoritarian or revolutionary challenges (Balibar 
emphasises Freud’s growing pessimism on this point), Freud’s reaction  is not just to dissolve 
the juridical back into the psychological, but to reframe the question of the psychoanalytic 
supplement of the ‘political’.  This involves Freud in questions of obedience, coercion and 
revolt. Here, however, ‘the State’s monopoly upon legitimate violence’ is not itself 
psychologized, Balibar argues, as a phantasmic projection of the unconscious, which would 
only redouble the question of the ‘political’ and the ‘psychic’ to the point of an ‘infinite 
regression’ (241). Instead, the psychic processes involved in the reaction to State power are, 
in Balibar’s terms, ‘fundamentally antinomial’ in character. The ‘psychic tribunal’ endured 
by the subject, in which the ego is a constant site of anxiety, recalls an analogy with the inner 
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workings of conscience and consciousness that runs from classical conceptions of morality all 
the way through to Kantianism. Yet, for Balibar, Freud tests or twists this ‘moral’ analogy in 
a modern sense by effectively reinvoking the question of the norm that sanctions, in terms of 
the role played in such a ‘tribunal’ by a hypermorality that at once ‘reigns in’ the unconscious 
but also, in its very excess, surpasses distinctions between good and evil, autonomy and 
heteronomy, morality and law.  Here we find ‘the ultrajuridical authority of the super-ego’ as 
the archetype of every real tribunal, rather than their allegorical equivalent (245). Such an 
‘authority’ is tied to familial or collective discipline aimed not so much at prompting full 
identification as a certain separation and individualization. The conception of the super-ego 
does not therefore entail the dissolution of the ‘political’ into the ‘psychic’ but rather operates 
as the mechanism by which subjects are interpellated as individuals (Balibar uses this 
Althusserian term). The subject is not subject of a law that projects and extends a regressive 
psychic truth, but is instead psychically individuated, in relation to the law, on the basis of 
just this ‘psychoanalytic’ term. Where Kelsen had perhaps struggled, despite himself, to 
separate the juridical norm from the psychoanalytic supplement (but also to put their relations 
in order), Freud attempts to rework the essentially antinomial relation of psyche and law—the 
‘political’ itself, perhaps—in a way that recovers for psychoanalysis a degree of theoretical 
consistency that Kelsen’s writing seemed to place in doubt, while also leading to implications 
that cause psychoanalysis to overspill itself, if one may put it that way.  
  
The part played by the super-ego in the ‘juridical moment’ of subjection involves social or 
structural relations whereby the connections between paternal or parental authority and 
political authority are not necessarily to be conceived in terms of the usual, orderly linear 
analogies. Instead, it is the ‘ultrajuridical’ authority of the super-ego that repetitively 
redoubles, torsions, invaginates, matricizes, or continually retransfers and turns inside out the 
relationships between the two—to the benefit of the forms of guilt and repression, the 
continual threat of punitive action, and even the onset of alienation and anomie that together 
subjectify individuals within grids of power. This subjectification entails not so much the 
collaboration of familial and social levels of authority as the persistent operation of 
contradictions between them. And yet the juridical order that establishes the context for this 
situation is only grounded on the very same conflicts that thereby threaten its decomposition 
as much as they secure its ‘politics’—a conflictual situation, then, which is therefore 
continually repressed as much as it is maintained. Balibar terms this the ‘impolitical’ limit or 
condition of the political itself.   
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Freud’s Super-Ego 
 
Balibar’s reading, therefore, of the evolution of a Freudian conception of the super-ego—and, 
crucially, its implications for an emergent psychoanalytic discourse of the ‘political’—turns 
upon the critical reworking of this term in his 1923 essay, ‘The Ego and the Id’.6 In this 
respect, it is important to grasp the specific set of claims that Freud wishes to set out and 
repeatedly underscore throughout the essay, as well as to trace the textual operations that 
underpin them. Certainly this text displays a degree of critical sophistication—one might 
better say, theoretical ambition—in its construal of the super-ego that one would perhaps 
struggle to find in earlier writings. First of all, on several occasions Freud is at pains to point 
out that the super-ego is not only an ‘energetic’ reaction-formation against the earliest object-
choices of the id, but is also a ‘residue’ of them. The super-ego, in other words, constitutes 
itself on the strength of a situation in which ego-formation, faced with a legacy of 
unsatisfactory identifications arising from the id’s forsaken cathexes, resorts to the 
supplementary agency of an ego-ideal which in fact threatens to overwhelm it, a power 
therefore that the ego endeavours to resist even in the context of a certain constitutive 
dependency upon it.  Freud thus writes that ‘the ego is formed to a great extent out of 
identifications which take the place of abandoned cathexes by the id… the first of these 
identifications always behave as a special agency in the ego and stand apart from the ego in 
the form of a super-ego, while later on, as it grows stronger, the ego may become more 
resistant to the influences of such identifications’ (48). In other words, the super-ego arises on 
condition of the unresolved early conflicts of the ego with the problematic object-cathexes of 
the id—a conflictual situation that recourse to the super-ego not merely overcomes but also in 
a certain sense prolongs or exacerbates. Hence, should the ego fail to master the cathexes 
emanating from the id, the reaction-formation of the ego-ideal will as much resituate as 
resolve them on the ego’s behalf.  From this point of view, the the super-ego emerges not 
simply to help the ego overcome the id—something the ego can’t manage alone—but it 
works instead to re-establish a connection to the unresolved concerns of the id that the ego 
proves itself unable to tackle by itself. Thus the super-ego is not merely an ally or counterpart 
in the ego’s hostile relations with the id.  It is, in fact, radically proximous to the id and can 
even act as its representative or broker vis-à-vis the ego. Freud goes so far as to state that the 
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super-ego reaches deep down into the id and as such displays a greater degree of detachment 
from consciousness than the ego is capable of. 
 
On several occasions, Freud tells us that the position occupied by the super-ego in the psychic 
field occurs on the strength of a parental dynamic characterized by Oedipal relations. On the 
one hand, the super-ego differentiates itself from—and seeks to dominate—the ego on the 
basis of an identification with a ‘higher’ human nature modelled on the moral position 
typically held by one’s parents. By the same token, however, the super-ego as a reaction-
formation provoked by the id’s most powerful impulses is precisely the ‘heir’ of the Oedipus 
complex, ‘heir’ to those early conflicts of the ego with the object-cathexes of the id. The 
super-ego, in other words, is at once parent and child.  Taking to the stage in the drama of 
Oedipal overcoming that the ego must perform, the super-ego serves only to reintroduce the 
constitutive ambivalence responsible for its own appearance on the scene. It encourages a 
moral identification with the father—‘you ought to be like this’—but also imposes a 
prohibition or repression that safeguards the limits of such identification—‘you may not be 
like this’, ‘you may not do all that he does, some things are his prerogative’ (34). The ego is 
thus exhorted to attain maturity in the image of the parent but at the same time it is 
powerfully repositioned as an offspring, indeed subjected to an arresting infantilization 
through which Oedipal relationships are powerfully reconstituted. Thus the parent-child 
doublet that characterizes the ambivalent ‘familial’ role of the super-ego is strangely 
recreated in the very image of the ego, as if the unstable patterns of domination and struggle 
played out between them are intersected by an uncanny non-self-identical doubleness that 
destines their kinship relations to remain fraught and unresolved. 
    
Freud tells us that the dread inspired in the ego by the super-ego is ‘the fear of conscience’ 
connected to the Oedipal relations that permeate their interactions (57). Here, again, the 
super-ego assumes a hyper-parental power while at the same time doing so through access to 
the legacy of an unresolved primal encounter between ego and id. Thus, one might say, the 
guilt inflicted upon the subject, making of them at once a conscience-following grown-up and 
a blameworthy adolescent, derives from the whims or caprices of an impossibly childish 
parent. To be fearful of ‘conscience’ is to know that, whether one accepts or rejects it, one 
loses either way. Conscience is cruel, in other words, casting its victim in an impossible 
predicament that in fact only reflects the cruel duplicity of the perpetrator. As Freud himself 
puts it:  
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In all these situations the super-ego displays its independence of the conscious ego 
and its intimate relations with the unconscious id… From the point of view of 
instinctual control, of morality, it may be said of the id that it is totally non-moral, of 
the ego that it strives to be moral, and of the super-ego that it it can be super-moral 
and then become as cruel as only the id can be’ (52-54) 
 
The super-ego is at once more ‘knowing’ of the originary power of the unconscious than the 
ego might ever be, and yet at the same time, precisely to the extent that it is under the 
influence of the unconscious itself, such ‘knowledge’ must inevitably stem from what is 
profoundly unknowable. ‘Analysis eventually shows that the super-ego is being influenced by 
processes that have remained unknown to the ego’, writes Freud, and through this insight it 
becomes possible ‘to discover the repressed impulses which are really at the bottom of the 
sense of guilt’. ‘Thus in this case the super-ego knew more than the ego about the 
unconscious id’ (51), just as psychoanalysis knows more of such matters than anyone else 
precisely on the strength of its unparalleled contact with unconscious forces which are 
themselves, nonetheless, barely susceptible to those conscious or ego-driven strategies for 
which the term ‘knowledge’ seems primarily designed. Psychoanalysis, in other words, 
adopts the position of the super-ego at the very moment it proclaims the possibility of such 
paradoxical ‘knowledge’ through its own conceptualisation of the ego-ideal. And, again, such 
a gesture may appear to us at once excessively parental and extraordinarily capricious, even 
infantile in both its unexamined presumption and its precocious double logic. In the process, 
of course, Freud’s claim in ‘The Ego and the Id’ that psychoanalysis is ‘an instrument to 
enable the ego to achieve a progressive conquest of the id’ (56) becomes deeply 
problematical to the extent that through its effective identification with the super-ego such 
analysis is just as much embroiled in the powerful impulses of the id and presumably, 
therefore, just as cruel ‘as only the id can be’. 
 
It is interesting, however, that during the course of his essay Freud makes explicit the analogy 
between analysis and its subject-matter not by drawing out the implied identity between the 
psychoanalyst and the super-ego, but instead through putting the ‘physician’ of the psyche in 
the position of the ego itself. The latter he describes as ‘poor creature owing service to three 
masters and consequently menaced by three dangers; from the external world, from the libido 
of the id, and from the severity of the super-ego’. On this score, one can well imagine how 
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readily Freud might identify with such a beleaguered counterpart in trying to negotiate such 
complex and multiple forces or pressures. The ego, then, is presented—much like the 
analyst—as ‘a frontier-creature’ mediating between the world and the id. (Elsewhere he 
writes that the super-ego is constituted by relations that, in contrast to the ego’s facing toward 
the external world, are at bottom internal to the world of the id, so that the interactions 
between the ego and super-ego are essentially a matter of this boundary or threshold between 
the two (36).) Putting psychoanalysis in the position of the ego rather than that of the super-
ego obviously appeals to Freud’s sense of his discipline or practice as the rational pursuit of a 
well-brokered relationship between the conscious and unconscious realms which inevitably 
weigh upon each and every individual. To the extent that such a depiction of psychoanalysis 
serves to ameliorate or even conceal the otherwise unfortunate connotations that may be 
drawn from an implied identification with the super-ego, however, the ‘frontier-creature’ is 
here as much guilty of forceful repression as felicitous conciliation. As Freud tells us, the ego 
is prone to repress the unconscious origin of its own guilt, and, in the case of the hysteric, the 
ego ‘fends off a distressing perception with which the criticisms of the super-ego threaten it, 
in the same way in which it is in the habit of fending off an unendurable object-cathexis—by 
an act of repression. It is the ego, therefore, that is responsible for the sense of guilt remaining 
unconscious’. If this is the predicament of psychoanalysis itself, it is all the more telling that 
Freud continues: ‘We know that as a rule the ego carries out repressions in the service and at 
the behest of its super-ego; but this is a case in which it has turned the same weapon against 
its harsh taskmaster… the ego succeeds only in keeping at a distance the material to which 
the sense of guilt refers’ (51-52). Freud’s own explicit identification with the ego thus turns 
out to constitute merely another maneouvre in the internecine battle with that ‘harsh 
taskmaster’ that threatens to expose its guilty secrets. In this sense, the ‘truth’ of 
psychoanalysis discloses itself once more from the perspective of the super-ego, rather than 
emanating from the ruses of the ego—albeit that the latter turns out to deploy exactly the 
same weapons as its supposed adversary.  
 
Indeed, this drift of the ego towards the super-ego that it wants to resist—a drift brought 
about not least because such resistance is mounted through recourse to the rival’s own 
amoury—leads to some rather revealing textual constructions. The ego ‘behaves like the 
physician during an analytic treatment’ in the sense that ‘it offers itself, with the attention it 
pays to the real world, as a libidinal object to the id, and aims at attaching the id’s libido to 
itself. It is not only a helper to the id; it is also a submissive slave who courts his master’s 
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love’ (56). Drawn intimately to the super-ego through acts of courtship presumably bent on a 
certain yielding and consummation, such an ego becomes in the process an instrument of the 
id as much as its opponent. The distinction between ego and super-ego, so important in other 
parts of the text, here seems to erode.  The ego itself begins to take on a semblance of cruelty, 
duplicity and immaturity that we’ve already identified as more characteristic of the id or the 
super-ego. It ‘too often yields to the temptation to become sycophantic, opportunist and lying, 
like a politician who sees truth but wants to keep his place in popular favour’ (56). The image 
of the ego—or, for that matter, the analyst—as a ‘good’ politician, a dignified and rational 
representative serving the interests of others from a balanced and dispassionate point of view, 
here quickly mutates into the inevitable corollary of the corrupt official who is guilty of lies 
and flattery, who is capable of bribery and intrigue, and whose respectable veneer is merely a 
convenient cover for rampant self-interest. This is the ego that uses the entire arsenal of its 
‘harsh taskmaster’ to better resist their nature, only to succumb all the more deeply to it as a 
consequence. This is the ego with whom, as we’ve already suggested, Freud identifies, not 
fully appreciating the implications of such an act. Elsewhere, meanwhile, Freud observes that 
‘in the matter of action the ego’s position is like that of a constitutional monarch, without 
whose sanction no law can be passed but who hesitates long before imposing his veto on any 
measure put forward by Parliament’ (55).   Once more, we glimpse an image of the ego’s 
impotent sovereignty, its fading power eloquently traced in the effete figure of a puppet king 
dominated by forces they can barely comprehend. Lastly, by undergoing ‘the attacks of the 
super-ego or perhaps even succumbing to them’, the ego’s fate is that of the ‘protista’ or 
protozoa that is ‘destroyed by the products of decomposition that they themselves have 
created’ (57). The fall from grace is complete, the ego reduced to a bare organism capable 
only of self-destruction. 
 
 
Psycho-politics 
 
If such a turn of events is worrisome for a psychoanalysis that wants, however duplicitously 
or unadvisedly, to identify with the ego, it also suggests consequences for the organization of 
systems that are not merely natural but in several of Freud’s examples explicitly political. 
This brings us back, perhaps, to Balibar’s concern to weigh the political implications of the 
Freudian concept of the super-ego as it develops over time and in a variety of forms and 
contexts. As we saw, Kelsen’s engagement with Freud—which Balibar views as so critical in 
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terms of the refinement of the latter’s thinking—demonstrates Kelsen’s own incapacity to 
entirely exclude from the juridical conception of the state that he wishes to uphold the 
performative injunction we might associate with the idea of a sanction, one which itself 
causes identification on the part of the subject with a motivated force or power. To the extent 
that this ‘sanction’ appears inseparable from the workings of the juridico-political in its state 
form, the psychoanalytic supplement to political theory is not reducible merely to therapeutic 
inputs designed to ameliorate regressive mythologies. Instead, the implication of Balibar’s 
essay is that Kelsen’s intervention, in all its complexity or equivocality, permits Freud not 
simply to dissolve the juridical back into the psychological, but rather to reframe anew the 
question of the psychoanalytic supplement of the political itself. For Balibar, the subject that 
may be derived from this encounter is less the subject of a law that itself embodies and 
extends a regressive psychological truth, but is instead psychically individuated in respect to 
the operations of a law constructed upon deeply antinomial relations. Such relations, in other 
words, function by intensifying and exploiting contradictions rather than by promoting or 
enforcing analogies and correlations, in such a way that any simplistic model tracing 
connections or resemblances between certain political formations, on the one hand, and 
particular psychic conditions, on the other, rather misses the point.  
 
Whether or not the political ‘figures’ found in Freud’s essay ‘The Ego and the Id’ work in 
such a way as to bear out this assertion, it is certainly true that the image of the super-ego that 
emerges from its pages may be characterized, on the one hand, as much by its detachment 
from the ego as by dint of patterns of identification or types of projection; while, on the other, 
the non-self-identical doubleness of ego and super-ego (far from the same thing as a 
correlative interrelationship) serves to position the ego in terms of forms of agency or 
sovereignty that are exposed as ineffectual, exploitable, and finally empty. While the 
‘sanction’ of the constitutional monarch seems quite different from that of the super-ego, 
adding merely the weak veneer of respectability to a corrupt and manipulative political order, 
what lurks behind it is still the cruel power of a super-ego that the ego can barely repress, 
indeed which it may hold at arms length only to intensify by half-masking its insidious sway. 
The subject of the state ‘sanction’ for which the super-ego may provide a certain name is 
therefore not merely the citizen but ultimately the sovereign himself. It is also, of course, the 
psychoanalyst, whose ego-formation and self-identification turns out—if ‘The Ego and the 
Id’ is anything to go by—to confirm what Balibar calls the antinomial forces at work in the 
very question of a psychoanalytic supplement of politics.   The intricate dynamics of this 
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question should, we must assume, be read back into not only Freud’s writings or for that 
matter his exchanges with interlocutors and contemporaries like Kelsen, but they must surely 
also condition any effort to weigh the legacy and value of psychoanalytic thought from a 
political perspective (including the attempt by Balibar himself). For Melanie Klein, the shift 
from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive position in the journey of ego-formation was 
thought to lessen the severity of a super-ego not contingent as in Freud upon the primacy of 
Oedipal relations. For Lacan, certainly insofar as authors like Slavoj Žižek are concerned, the 
super-ego forces us to betray the law of desire, demanding jouissance as nothing but a violent 
and traumatic intrusion which causes more pain than pleasure, notably since the betrayal it 
imposes on us constitutes the actual origin or explanation for our guilt. However, various 
attempts within the field of psychoanalysis to refine or rework the concept of the super-ego 
are surely just as much subject to the question of this psycho-political dynamic. It is one that 
asks not merely about the ‘psychic’ conditions of politics, but also the ‘politics’ of 
psychologizing discourse in all its forms. And let us remember, its ‘double’ effects—if past 
results are anything to go by—are likely to be as much antinomial and divisive as they may 
be instructive and empowering.     
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